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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

Industrial Strife in Sweden.—Mr. O. Dalqvist has for years been especially interested in the question of strikes and lockouts. He gives in Häft 9, 1900, of the *Ekonomisk Tidskrift* the following figures illustrative of Swedish conditions:

Year	Number of Strikes	Number of Laborers Involved	Loss in Work Days
1886.....	12	1,185	15,700
1887.....	4	300	4,300
1888.....	12	2,200	5,350
1889.....	22	2,379	36,190
1890.....	107	3,900	126,100
1891.....	37	2,317	74,120
1892.....	16	1,346	105,900
1893.....	32	2,269	201,350
1894.....	18	768	4,790
1895.....	46	2,929	16,110
1896.....	50	4,600	195,200
1897.....	90	5,930	80,100
1898.....	134	16,700	184,400
1899.....	62	8,667	205,900

Several interesting tendencies of Swedish industrial life are self-evident in these figures; it is apparent that industrial wars are being fought on a larger and more obstinate scale, and one notes a sort of rhythm in the recurrence of ebb and flow. Of late years lockouts are increasing in number and faster than strikes; of the lost labor days of 1899 172,200 are chargeable to lockouts. Employers seem to be taking the offensive, this being due, according to the present writer, to a sinking conjuncture in the labor market.—A. G. KELLER, Yale University.

Spanish Trade since the Spanish-American War.—*De Economist* reports an augmented activity in Spanish trade since the war with the United States. In 1899 not less than sixty-one large companies were formed in Bilbao, the scene of the greatest advance; these companies employ a capital of 128,000,000 pesetas (\$25,600,000), and comprise twenty-three ship companies, seven banks, eight sugar factories, seven electric factories, and seven mining companies. This is an advance unheard of in the history of the country. The yearly increasing merchant fleet of Bilbao has also led to the establishment of a new Spanish marine insurance company, having a capital of 10,000,000 pesetas (\$2,000,000).

Bilbao's chief article of export is iron ore. The following table gives quantity and destination of shipments by years (in thousands of tons):

Countries	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899
Great Britain.....	3,434	3,712	3,527	3,347	4,351
Netherlands.....	660	871	893	883	993
Belgium.....	163	141	213	182	229
France.....	317	356	383	278	299
Germany.....	66	50	49
United States.....	18	50	35	3	83
Other lands.....	4	8
Total.....	4,596	5,138	5,117	4,743	6,004

—A. G. KELLER, Yale University.

The Cost of Crime.—To the end of arousing a more general interest in the means employed to diminish crime, an estimate of the pecuniary loss on account of crime in the United States is given. This estimate must include that part of national, state, county, town, and city taxation chargeable to crime and its prevention, and also the loss inflicted on the people by acts of crime. In the cost through taxation there should be included, not only the cost of maintenance of prisons, police, and courts, but also a part of the cost of legislation, of the judicial and military expenses, and of charities. The estimates are largely without direct statistical foundation, and are entitled to weight only as the carefully formed opinions of men who have given serious study to the subject of crime.

Taking New York, Cleveland, Chicago, St. Louis, San Francisco, Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans as representative cities in which the statistics are fairly complete, and inferring the condition of the rest of the cities from the condition of these, the conclusion is reached that the average cost of crime through taxation is not less than \$3.50 per capita of the entire city population. From general considerations it seems probable that the rate in rural communities cannot be more than \$1 per capita. Accepting these rates, we reach a final computation of the annual cost of crime in the United States in the following summary:

City and county taxation chargeable to crime—30,000,000 inhabitants at \$3.50 each	\$105,000,000
Town and county taxation chargeable to crime—45,000,000 inhabitants at \$1 each	45,000,000
Federal and state taxation chargeable to crime, not less than	50,000,000
Total	\$200,000,000

But this is only the beginning of the cost of crime. Estimating the average annual income of habitual criminals at \$1,600, and the number of such criminals at 250,000, we have an aggregate annual income of the criminal class of \$400,000,000, which, added to the \$200,000,000 yearly taxation caused by crime, gives the enormous total of \$600,000,000. But the end is not yet. Four hundred million dollars represents only the net profits of crime, not the loss and actual damage caused by crime. It does not include the malicious destruction of property, the money value of life and labor, nor the cost of locks, bolts, bars, safety deposit vaults, and burglar alarms. While these items cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy, they are none the less real counts in the cost of crime.

Even if the computation made in this paper seems to be based on conjecture, there is absolutely no doubt as to the real existence of all the elements of cost that have entered into the computation, nor as to the significance and magnitude of the final aggregate.—EUGENE SMITH, "The Cost of Crime," Report prepared for the International Prison Commission, in *House Document 491*, Fifty-Sixth Congress, Second Session. R. A.

Intellectual Anarchy.—About the middle of the eighteenth century there arose in France a school whose religion was freedom of thought, and whose God was the one word "liberty;" a word which they interpreted for the public to mean illimitable promises of all good things, but for themselves to mean the right to say anything, to dare anything, and to take anything, without having to render account to anyone. Though excesses have been committed in the name of liberty, yet it has a legitimate place in the language. It cannot be considered a generative principle of our acts, or a metaphysical entity; and still less can it be placed in the social categories of religion, family, and private property. It is, however, the result of an inherent principle in man. This principle is conscience, the origin of moral law. To be in accord with morality, as interpreted by conscience, is to be free. He alone is free who finds within himself, in the very fundamental law of his nature, the motives of his acts.

Conscience is innate and can never be superimposed upon man through the instrumentality of religion. All religions serve, in varying degrees, to be sure, to develop this faculty, if such it can be called. Any religion, however barbarous or depraved, is better than no religion. But, above all, the Christian religion has made man free indeed. It has removed all the hindrances to moral freedom. In condemning all his vices, it has rendered man capable of all liberty.

A so-called liberal school that ranked Frederic II., Catherine II., and Napoleon I. among its gods, that canonized Danton and Robespierre, tried to crush all religious

idea. This school soon went from attacking the representatives of the church to denouncing the principles of the church. To them freedom of worship and political liberty were only the outer garb of free thought. Absolute independence of mind was their one idea. The emancipation of the individual alone was worthy of the struggles and sufferings of the human race. Revolutions and butcheries found justification at their hands if one social authority or custom were destroyed, and to curb in the least the fantasies of the mind was the unpardonable sin. For them civilization had no measure except the independence of individual opinions. They were concerned, not with freedom of conscience, but with freedom of thought, a purely intellectual freedom which would abolish all authority superior to the mind of man. They confounded truth with the mind that conceived it. Reason was made supreme in all things. Good and bad, the true and the false, became only matters of opinion. This school brought into question God, the soul, moral responsibility, the distinction of good and bad, national traditions, social sanctions, public powers, laws, customs, the family, creeds, codes, and institutions—all the work of centuries. They proclaimed that the true function of intelligence is to compare systems and analyze ideas.

Not in the material realm the Revolution worked its greatest ruin, but in the realm of ideas. The intellectual anarchy it brought with it is more to be regretted than the political chaos it caused.

As when a flood recedes there appear new forms of land, so out of this torrent of intellectual and political anarchy came two new forms: democracy, with its accompaniment of universal suffrage, and the republic. The permanency of these institutions is not yet assured. It is doubtful whether wisdom resides with the majority. To say that it does is to say that one vote is as intelligently made up as another. This, however, can hardly be believed when men are so unequal. Why should we talk of conscience and responsibility when all we need in deciding great questions is to count up the votes? Nothing is more changeable than the popular will. Ideas and beliefs are judged, not by their intrinsic merit, but by the number of those who hold them. Such a régime subordinates knowledge to ignorance, mind to matter, and intellect to instinct, and can only destroy in the people all notions of order and justice, and render impossible any union of social elements.

Universal suffrage implies popular education. Emblems and national songs are among the most powerful means of popular education. They give in a sign or a sentence the inspiring thoughts of the people and constantly call out their feelings of patriotism. For a republic no words are more thrilling than "liberty, equality, and fraternity." For some people national holidays are a means of cultivating a national unity. But for France to commemorate great days is to dwell on days of violence and bloodshed, is to celebrate fury and cruelty. If the above were the whole of our history, we should be a people without faith, without hope, and without guides. (*To be continued.*)—M. FAVIÈRE, "L'Anarchie intellectuelle," in *Réforme sociale*, January 16, 1901. T. J. R.

State Boards of Control.—An increasing population and the growth of humanitarian sentiment have resulted in a rapid increase in the number of state institutions for the care of the unfortunate and the reform of the unsocial members of the community. In order to correct loose and irresponsible methods in the administration of these charitable and correctional institutions there has been a noticeable increase in the number of central responsible boards in the states. These boards may be grouped into two classes: the first have the powers of supervision, inspection, and recommendation, but leave the business management of each institution to a local board of trustees; the second exercise a positive control over the state institutions, and assume full responsibility for their management, and also exercise a control over the localities in certain phases of their charitable and reformatory work.

Among the state boards of charity and reform which have combated the tendency toward centralization, the state board of Illinois has been especially conspicuous. A perusal of the reports of this board will discover many complaints common to the class first named above: complaints of the need of a larger authority for the state board, particularly in the treatment of the insane by the county authorities; complaints of political influence in appointments; of lobbying and wastefulness in securing appropriations; of careless and unsystematic methods of the local boards of

trustees; and of the limited business field, preventing the utilization of the advantages of the market in purchasing supplies. A forthcoming report of this board recommends the substitution of a board of control for the present supervisory board.

In Wisconsin the state board has passed through the various stages of administrative control, and since 1891 the board has had the management of all the charitable and correctional institutions belonging to the state. It is charged with the maintenance, government, and direct management of these institutions. It must preserve and care for, and make annually a full and complete inventory and appraisal of, the property of each institution. The members must make monthly visits to each institution, and provide all needful regulations for the officers and employes, courses of study, tuition, and maintenance of pupils. The board has given nominating power to the superintendents and wardens, and holds them responsible for efficient assistants. The board has assumed full responsibility for the purchase of staple supplies, and has introduced into this public business the efficiency and economy of private business. These supplies are sometimes purchased from firms outside the state.

In Wisconsin the board of control not only directs the administration of the state institutions, but also has been given a large control over the affairs of the locality in certain phases of its activity. The first step in the development of this central control lies in the power of the board to condemn jails, poorhouses, prisons, and lockups on sanitary grounds. The second step applies to the care of the chronic insane. The board selects county asylums for the care of these persons securing to the patients larger freedom and more homelike surroundings, to the state, economy, elasticity, and effective control. However, the most important advantage of the system is the strong control exercised by the board over the county asylums and poorhouses without destroying the responsibility of the county authorities in the management of their institutions. It establishes this control by advancing to each county institution one-half of the support of the chronic patients, and thereby fixing a certain standard of efficiency before the county hospital will be selected for such purposes.—SAMUEL E. SPARLING, "State Boards of Control," in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1901.

T. J. R.

The Industrial Development of Germany.—On comparing the industrial census of Germany for 1882 with that for 1895, two facts become evident: first, there has been great industrial growth; second, the period is marked by the extraordinary development of large industrial establishments. Both facts stand together. Indeed, the first is accounted for by the second. The number of establishments has increased but 1.3 per cent., while the number of persons engaged in trade and industry has increased 39.9 per cent. Hence the largest part of this increment to the working force has been absorbed in the growth of the great industries. Defining small industries as those employing not more than five persons, middle industries as those employing from six to fifty people, and great industries as those with over fifty employes, we find that the small establishments have grown 1.8 per cent., while the middle and great classes have increased respectively 69.7 per cent. and 90 per cent. The effect of this centralization has been increased production, which is due largely to the economic utilization of motive power in the great establishments. In 1895 at least three-fourths of the industrial production of Germany came from these great factories.

The social significance of such development may be seriously questioned as pointing to recession of the independent middle class. But the loss of industrial self-sufficiency does not bring a loss of social and legal status. It is true that the ratio of entrepreneurs to the entire industrial population has diminished. But, on the other hand, the class of managers, clerks, and overseers has increased almost twice as fast as that of artisans. Moreover, the conditions of work are better, and the means of enforcing labor regulations are more secure under the great factory system. Such development does not tend, therefore, to the degradation of labor. Nor can the socialists claim that there is a tendency toward state control of industry, for the statistics show that the number of public employes has increased less rapidly than that of those who work for private concerns. There is a tendency to combination, however, and the employes of such companies have grown most rapidly in number. The type of combination is the joint-stock company, rather than the industry under the control of a single capitalist. So that there is a certain division of authority and responsibility.

Examining some of the special phases of the growth more in detail, Dr. Freig finds that the percentage of women in industry is increasing. This is most noticeable in textile manufactures and in the clerk class. On the other hand, the percentage of married women employed in work outside of their homes is falling. So, too, the number of children in relation to the whole number of workers is decreasing with the growth of large industries. Less encouraging is the conclusion that the relative number of apprentices tends to decrease in the large industries. The highest percentage of learners is found in the small industries, particularly those of an artistic type. With regard to the periodicity of industry, the author finds that not less than 10.9 per cent. of all the lines of work are carried on for only a part of the year. Most of them run from six to eight months; some are open for only three months. The social significance of this fact will be appreciated when it is realized that most of the enforced idleness falls in the winter months. The article closes with some remarks on the localization of industry and some suggestions as to trade policy.—DR. JOHANNES FREIG, "Deutschlands gewerbliche Entwicklung seit dem Jahre 1882," in *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft* (viertes Heft), 1900. H. B. W.

The Origin of the Cities of Western Europe.—On assuming the chair of comparative legislation in the Collège de France, M. Frantz Funck-Brentano delivered his opening lecture on the conditions of Europe from the seventh to the eleventh century, in the midst of which the western towns arose. There is much discussion, but little documentary evidence, upon this obscure period. Five theories are offered to explain the origin of the cities: (1) the ancient Roman towns survived the barbarian invasions, with essential structure but slightly altered; (2) the towns grew from points fortified for common defense; (3) they grew up about the sites of the mediæval fairs; (4) they developed naturally from rural communities by the growth of trade and industry; (5) they were established by bodies of merchants who sought a favorable place for trade.

M. Brentano declares that the invasions of the barbarians destroyed all the bonds of Roman civilization in western Europe. The local chieftains harried and plundered each other, and the people fled from the highways and the rivers. But one group was left—the family. The bonds of this circle were drawn more tightly as the social stress without increased. The individual was obliged to find refuge in such a group or perish. And so the authority of the head of the family was greatly increased, and a sort of domestic code was established. People who did not belong to such a group by birth sought its protection and entered its numbers according to a fictitious scheme of relationship. From the subordination thus developed the feudal system gradually arose. Such was the social conditions in which the city rose.

In treating of the development of the towns, M. Brentano follows the general scheme of his master, M. Flach. The latter holds that the cities originated in several ways. Some of them grew up about the castle of a local noble. Peasants and merchants sought the protection of the lord of the château; and he was glad to profit by their industry. Similarly about the monasteries of the church, groups of artisans and agriculturists sought refuge about the strong walls and under the shadow of the cross. The people gave their services and contributed of their goods in return for protection and the granting of certain privileges. Walled villages also grew into cities when privileges and liberties were granted to the heads of households by the sovereign of the realm. The so-called "new towns" were established for purposes of profit or defense. They arose in three ways: (1) the *villes-neuves frontières* of the ninth and tenth centuries were merely fortresses into which all sorts of people were gathered to defend the inhabitants against the Normans and Saracens; (2) the *villes-neuves sau-vetés* of the eleventh and twelfth centuries were little communities established about the cross of the church, as places of refuge from the sword of the robber nobles; (3) the *villes-neuves bastides* of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were regular towns laid out by the monarch as points of support and sources of revenue. The towns were peopled by the folk who sought refuge from the more stringent exactions of the local nobility.—FRANTZ FUNCK-BRENTANO, "La formation des villes dans l'Europe occidentale aux origines de la civilisation moderne," in *Reforme sociale*, January 16, 1901.

H. B. W.

The Socialistic Idea of the State.—M. Dramas defines the state as “a moral personality representing the superior and constant interests of the society.” In the light of this definition he proposes to discuss M. Deville’s thesis: that the state is “the public power of coercion which the division into classes has created and maintains in human societies; and which, wielding the power, makes the law and receives the taxes.”

It is obvious that the attitude of the working classes toward the state will vary according as they hold one or the other of these conceptions of the government. Accordingly we find within the socialistic pale parties varying from the revolutionary anarchists to the social democrats. Thus the Marxists conceive of the state as an arbitrary, coercive power under the control of the *bourgeoisie*. And against this artificial authority the working people are urged to rebel, and to assert their inherent human rights against the “classes.”

But, our author asks, can the state be an instrument of one class, and yet come to be hostile to the interests of society as a whole? Where the elements of a state are in such hostility that no equilibrium of interests can be maintained disruption of the government ensues. That the state may assert its power it must be the expression of the national consciousness. Thus the first end of the state was the common defense. The alliance of the various gentes to attain this was the result. That the rise of the Germanic state was due to the common *mores* of the conquering gentes Engels* himself points out. So in Athens as in Rome, it was the expression of the popular consciousness that took form in the laws and ordinances of the representative body, and M. Dramas shows how the fall of Rome was due to the diversity of interests which could not longer find coördination in the decrees of the senate. As Ant. Labriola shows, Christianity spread throughout Europe by adapting itself to the varied forms of local custom. The state, therefore, has its roots in the nature of the society itself, and is not an “invention.”

Based thus upon a corporate consciousness, the state has for its end the coördination of the interests of all the elements entering into its composition. To the attainment of this end it avails itself of public revenues; and for the promotion of the general welfare it promulgates its laws. It thus reinforces the power of the individual to proceed in ways of social usefulness, by granting to him the protection of its legal power. The state is the heritor of the ideas of the past, and is inspired with the ideals of the present. It mediates between contending systems and preserves what is best for all. It is thus in close and vital relations with its elements. And it is when the state ventures to cut loose from the traditions of its people or attempts to promote an interest that is not of general utility that it is torn by revolution. If the workingmen would only recognize this fact of the moral solidarity between the government and the governed, they would doubtless organize their members into a force that could be distinctly felt in the national consciousness. And thus they might attain the legalizing of the ideas and the recognition of the claims for which they contend.—PAUL DRAMAS, “L’Idée socialiste de l’État,” in *La Revue socialiste*, September, 1900. H. B. W.

The Organization of Labor.—“It is by work that men, possessing nothing or only a little, ought to procure that which is necessary to their existence.” Every day shows that many among those who work have not enough work, or not remunerative enough work, to buy even the necessities of life. And if work assures them their daily existence, it does not furnish enough so they can lay by something for times of business depression, for sickness, or for old age. Such a state of affairs, if painful to those who are its victims, is also inhuman and dangerous to the peace of modern society.

Charity in all its forms is often dangerous by the demoralization it engenders. Alms may often relieve the suffering, but they do not diminish the poverty. On the contrary, they often increase pauperism. Assistance through work is much better than mere almsgiving.

But a better plan than any yet found is assurance—a guarantee upon life, against sickness, accidents, old age, and business stagnation. This possesses in itself a moral code, and is in many cases the true remedy for the grave conditions we have named.

* Engels and Labriola are socialistic writers of the Marxist school.

Though it is easy to insure against accidents and sickness, it is almost impossible to insure against business stagnation; or to assure to each one the necessary work, and to insure each one from falling into poverty at some moment. Is the problem insoluble?

Free work has brought great good to civilization, and to no small degree benefited the workingman as compared with one hundred years ago; but one of the first consequences of it, free competition, has brought on a struggle, more and more intense, in which the strong have crushed the weak.

To prevent this crushing, some propose a scheme of collectivism, the real logic of socialism, under which all the powers, the property, the soil, the means of production, the distribution or division of goods, are concentrated in the state. The objections to such a system are so numerous and well known that it is useless to repeat them to economists.

But M. Thury, professor at the University of Geneva, approaches the problem a little differently. He is an individualist, and so is opposed to the socialist régime. In a recent publication on *The Social Question in its Principle, Looked at from a Religious Point of View*, he has formulated his principles that would form a basis for an essay on the organization of social work. Some of his leading ideas are expressed under such themes as: the right to the means of work derived from the obligation to work; the soil, the source of the necessities of life; individual or collective ownership of the soil; labor organizations and the use of machines; and the division of the products of labor. He summed up his propositions in these terms: "Let competition be free as to the comforts; reserve one realm, that of the necessities of life, and from that exclude speculation." This is not an entirely new régime, but is a kind of compromise between the old and the new conditions of society.—FRÉDÉRIC NECKER, "L'Organisation du Travail," in an exposition of M. Thury's labor theory, in *Réforme sociale*, December 16, 1900. T. J. R.

The Social Future of England.—Just as the democracies of the ancient world revealed the tendency to decline into tyrannies or oligarchies, so it is quite conceivable that the modern industrial movement which determines our political evolution may draw society into the clutches of an oligarchy. The truth is that up to the present the modern industrial movement has led and is leading up to a new aristocracy of wealth rather than toward a democracy. Industrialism of itself will not bring democracy; only a democratic ideal formed in the mind and governing action will accomplish that result. Now, my contention is that for all practical purposes no such democratic ideal animates the mass of English people.

Even though modern industrialism led of itself inevitably to democracy, there is the vital factor to be considered that the serious decline of England as a great industrial center has begun. If the future of England is not predominantly industrial, if the great staple trades are to pass from her grasp to the United States and the yellow races, what is England's future likely to be, and what will be the political effects resulting from her future economic condition?

Two possible solutions of this interesting problem present themselves, but in very different degrees of probability. If the English were a democratic people, the same solution would present itself which has been seized on by so many of the continental peoples—a vast peasant ownership, avoiding the pitfall of extreme *morcellement*, which would politically express itself in such democratic feeling and institutions as Switzerland, or perhaps Denmark, shows. But the economic movement in England is certainly not in that direction, but is absolutely toward the towns. The other alternative is that England is destined to be the pleasure-ground of the English-speaking people, and especially of the wealthy. The mass of English people, on this hypothesis, will more and more tend to be ministers in some way of this new rich class of English-speaking peoples who will repair, for purposes of health or culture, to their ancestral seats. For the less wealthy England will become a historical, museum, or possibly an academic center.

But the important factor to be noticed in the situation is the already vast increase of the servant classes and the still more rapid growth of this class as England abandons industrialism to act as entertainer of the English-speaking world. This kind of community could not possibly be democratic. There is no class less open to democratic ideas than a contented servant class. Compared with them, their titled and wealthy

employers are revolutionists. They cannot bear change; their minds are saturated with the idea of social grades and distinctions; they will not even live with one another on terms of social equality.

Two series of important considerations suggest themselves in relation to this problem of England's future. In the first place, would not the present urgent and appalling questions tend to shrink to far smaller proportions in a society such as is here outlined? Take three present-day problems—drink, housing, and population. The massing of the people in huge aggregations brings about conditions which create a demand for constant stimulants of a peculiarly dangerous kind; housing requirements are more difficult to meet; and population tends to increase most rapidly among the least desirable people.

The second consideration is that what little democratic power was evolved in England a generation ago is visibly declining. The obvious sign of this is the steady weakening of the House of Commons. In a word, it is here suggested that the marked decline in the democratic movement and the corresponding growth of bureaucracy are no temporary phenomena, but symptoms of permanent change.—WILLIAM CLARKE, "The Social Future of England," in *Contemporary Review*, December, 1900. E. M.

Penal System in France.—M. Cuche, in noting the differences or divergencies between the report made to the congress of Brussels by the government official of prisons on *L'État pénal et pénitentiaire de la France* and a memoir prepared on the same subject, brings out some points applicable to the system of prisons and penitentiaries in general.

The practice of indeterminate or cumulative sentences for criminals has had some degree of testing since 1893, and during this time it seems to have reduced the number of first convictions, as well as those of returned convicts; but it is evident that this beneficial result has been due, not to the prison itself, but to those who pass sentence; for they give a much severer penalty to one who falls after having had a respite than to one who has had no such extenuation. "The fear of the prison has shown itself much more effective than the prison itself."

One fault of the system in France is that the supervision is given to the department of the interior, which is already overworked, instead of being given to the minister of justice.

The government report for France says that, "if the system and the discipline propose as their chief aim the reform of the prisoners whom they discipline, they yet retain a nature of severity sufficient to intimidate those who are the most corrupt." In criticism of this the writer says that, if we would state the truth, the proportions of intimidation and of reform as quoted above would necessarily be reversed, for "the only efficiency that our penitentiary system can claim, with its prisons in common, its insufficient personnel, and its veritable and homeopathic doses of moral and religious influences, is its power to intimidate, and to inspire some fear in those who are punished." Not even in Belgium, where the penal régime may be considered among the best, is it claimed that it is the principal aim to reform the prisoner. Under the real conditions in France "one cannot hope that prisoners will go out better, but one can only hope that they may not go out worse; for one of the greatest injustices that society can commit against one of its members is to degrade that member by punishing him."

The writer finds also that one evil of the French system is in the personnel of the prison management, and the extreme difficulty of having capable men for this work on account of the disfavor in which society holds such positions.

One principle at the bottom of the educating policy of prison reform is that "ignorance and misery are the two great recruiting forces for crime." But instruction alone is no deterrent from crime, but often abets it by the skill it gives, and the actual figures from some provinces of France show that the so-called parallelism between crime and illiteracy is not true. More effective than literacy in improving a man is work. And so this work régime is to be preferred to the reforming, conditional-sentence scheme.—M. P. CUCHE, Professeur adjoint à la Faculté de droit de Grenoble, "État actuel de Système pénal et pénitentiaire en France," in *Revue pénitentiaire*, December 1900. T. J. R.

The Broadening of the Mental Horizon.—The rapidity and ease of communication which we have attained through the telegraph, telephone, the press, and other agencies has made man's mind ubiquitous. London is now as near the antipodes in time necessary for exchange of news as Paris was to Lyons by the old *malles postes*. There is no longer a Russian chemistry nor a strictly national literature. But science and *belles-lettres* are the common possession of civilization; and every art cabinet has specimens from Japan and India as well as from Flanders and Italy. "If it took a week for a sensation to get from the finger to the brain, there would be no human organism. Likewise when formerly it required years and then months for news to get from London to Calcutta, humanity could not constitute a single organism." But now the union is close and vital. "This is the first result of intellectual labor—the mental coalition of the civilized nations."

The second result is the *intellectualization* of the world. To the ancients but parts of the world were known. From mysterious regions descended barbarous hordes to waste and spoil. But now we know the whole of our planet. We are aware of what goes on in its farthest corners, and we feel a sense of vital unity with all the race. Thus man's horizon has extended from group to horde, through city and state to unions of nations, and finally to the whole world. So, too, our knowledge of the resources of the different lands has grown, until now we no longer fear disastrous famines, since "we could provision a continent." Moreover, we have knowledge of long ages beyond the short antiquity our fathers knew. So, too, men think more of the future now, look farther ahead, and plan more largely than they used to do. Society no longer lives from day to day. And so the imagination of the race has grown.

Formerly men hoped for an eternal state, for a fixed and perfect order. Now we know that all by its very nature changes. Once men thought to conquer by war and to right wrongs with the sword. Now we see the folly of slaughter, and know that social misery cannot be alleviated by destroying riches. So questions and methods change. The Roman lords died of inaction when they had conquered the basin of the Mediterranean; tomorrow our children shall strive to answer larger questions than we conceive; today our task is the removal of misery in all the world.—J. NOVICOW, from an abstract in *L'Humanité nouvelle*, October, 1900, of a work now in press.

Women Workers in Germany.—According to the industrial census of 1895, Germany had a population of 26,361,125 women. Of this number 19.97 per cent. were engaged in some profession or trade, and about 5 per cent. were domestic servants. The former class had increased over one million from 1882 to 1895; and at the latter date 18.4 per cent. of the entire working population were women. In the clothing, textile, and food-stuffs industries (where women workers would naturally be most numerous) female labor has tended to supplant male workers. For instance, in the tailoring trades the number of men increased 15.99 per cent. from 1882 to 1895, while the number of women increased 113.65 per cent. But even in those lines of industry in which the absolute number of women workers is least, the relative number, as compared with men, has increased rapidly. It seems, then, that women are pressing into new lines of work, and are practically monopolizing others.

The number of married women in all professional employments increased 48.12 per cent. from 1882 to 1895; whereas the number of single women increased but 14.36 per cent. during the same period. Many of the married women work at home—about 40 per cent. But perhaps the advantages of domestic surroundings are more than offset by the unsanitary conditions of such labor. The investigations conducted in Baden in 1898 revealed the fact that in 1894 27 per cent. of the adult women workers in factories were married; in 1898 they were 30 per cent. The cause for this element of labor is found in the necessity of supplementing the insufficient income of the head of the family. In proportion as the wage of the husband and father is raised, the wife and mother can devote herself to home duties. It seems impossible at the present time, however, to prohibit married women from working; but it is possible to limit the character and the duration of their labor.—E. DUBOIS, "Le travail des femmes en Allemagne, d'après les dernières statistiques," in *Revue sociale catholique*, December 1, 1900. H. B. W.